Empirical Approaches to Inequality of Opportunity: Principles, Measures, and Evidence

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Abstract
We put together the different conceptual issues involved in measuring inequality of opportunity, discuss how these concepts have been translated into computable measures, and point out the problems and choices researchers face when implementing these measures. Our analysis identifies and suggests several new possibilities to measure inequality of opportunity. The relevancy of the conceptual issues and modelling choices are illustrated with findings from the empirical literature on income inequality of opportunity.

Keywords: equality of opportunity, measurement, compensation, responsibility, effort, circumstances.

JEL classification: D3, D63.

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1 Introduction

Beyond the mere concern for individual differences or disparities in outcomes, which has dominated distributive concerns for many decades, the theory of equality of opportunity (Dworkin, 1981a,b; Arneson, 1989; Cohen, 1989) puts individual responsibility in the forefront when assessing situations of economic advantage and disadvantage. It is argued that outcomes such as income level, education attainment or health status, are determined by factors or variables that are beyond individuals’ responsibility (so-called circumstances) and by factors for which individuals are deemed responsible (so-called effort or responsibility variables). Inequalities that are due to circumstances are deemed ethically unacceptable while those arising from efforts are not considered offensive. That is, the “ideal” situation or benchmark is not perfect equality per se, as in the measurement of inequality of outcome, but a distribution where efforts are rewarded adequately and the effect of circumstances is compensated for, so that only disparities due to efforts remain.

Moreover, both attitude survey research (see, e.g., Schokkaert and Devooght (2003) and Gaertner and Schwettmann (2007)), and experimental evidence (see Cappelen et al (2010)) provide strong evidence that, in judging income distributions, people largely distinguish between circumstances and efforts in the way suggested by equality of opportunity theories. For instance, Cappelen et al (2010) elicit information on what people hold each other responsible for, by means of a dictator game where the distribution phase is preceded by a production phase, and find that a large majority of the participants did not hold people responsible for the randomly assigned price, an impersonal factor beyond individual control, but did hold them responsible for their choice of working time.

Equality of opportunity and its measurement is not only relevant from a normative point of view. First, a growing amount of empirical evidence shows that preferences for redistribution and political orientation are shaped by fairness concerns. For instance, Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) show for the United States that people who believe that individual economic success is related to individual effort rather than family background or luck, have lower preferences for redistribution, while Alesina and Angeletos (2005), using data from the World Value Survey, find that fairness perceptions are associated with the individuals’ political orientation: when people believe that effort is the main determinant of economic advantage, redistribution and taxes are low, whereas in societies where people think of birth and connections as the main determinants of economic success, taxes and redistribution will be higher. Second, since the determinants of economic inequality (circumstances versus efforts) influence individual incentives, these determinants are related with aggregate economic outcomes, such as economic growth. In its World Development Report of 2006, the World Bank argues that income inequality due to circumstances may lead to suboptimal accumulation of human capital and thus to lower growth, while income inequality due to responsibility-related variables may encourage individuals to invest in human capital and exert the largest effort possible (World Bank, 2005). In line with this, Marrero and Rodríguez (2010), using data for the U.S. from the Panel...
Survey on Income Dynamics, find that income inequality due to effort enhances income growth, while the part of income inequality which is accounted for by circumstances correlates negatively with growth. Our concern in this paper, however, is not which measure of inequality of opportunity is best suited to explain actual redistribution or economic growth, but rather with the measures that have been proposed in the normative literature dealing with the measurement of inequality of opportunity.

In recent years, we have seen an explosion of empirical literature that tries to determine whether opportunities are equally distributed, and tries to measure the extent of inequality of opportunity or the contribution of inequality of opportunity to total income inequality—see, e.g., Almas et al. (2011), Björklund et al. (2012), Bourguignon et al. (2007), Checchi and Peragine (2010), Devooght (2008), Lefranc et al. (2008) and Pistolesi (2009). The measurement of equality of opportunity entails many methodological and empirical questions that are often difficult to resolve. Rather than addressing these issues in a systematic and coherent manner, the literature has developed very rapidly in many seemingly unrelated directions. As a result, there is often no explicit correspondence between the theoretical principles and the measures put forth and employed to empirically implement the equality of opportunity approach.

Our main contribution is to bridge the gap between the theoretical and empirical literature by presenting and discussing in a systematic manner the main conceptual issues and the solutions that have been proposed. Our analysis identifies and suggests several new possibilities to measuring inequality of opportunity. However, we limit ourselves in several respects. First, we discuss inequality of opportunity for income. Hence we do not address the issues related to multi-dimensional outcomes, which arise for instance naturally in the capabilities approach. Due to the one-dimensional focus the opportunity set to which individuals have access contains only incomes, which drastically simplifies the comparison of individual’s opportunity sets. Inequality of opportunity for other one-dimensional outcomes, such as health and education has been analysed with techniques similar to the ones we describe here. Second, we do not discuss the design and evaluation of policies from an equality of opportunity perspective, as this raises different important, complex and often model dependent issues.

The theoretical literature has pointed out that the idea of equality of opportunity embodies two basic principles. The compensation principle, which demands that inequalities due to circumstances are eliminated and the reward principle, which is concerned about how to reward efforts amongst individuals

\footnote{See Schokkaert (2009) for a recent discussion of the capabilities approach.}

\footnote{For an overview of the literature on the evaluation of more general opportunity sets, see Barbera et al (2004).}

\footnote{See, e.g., Dias (2009) or Trannoy et al (2010) for health and Peragine and Serlenga (2008) for education.}

\footnote{Roemer (1998a) is a good starting point, and Pignatare (2011) provides a recent survey. For theoretical contributions on optimal tax policy see Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006 and 2007), Ooghe and Luttens (2007) or Jacquet and Van de Gaer (2011). For the evaluation of social programs see Van de Gaer et al (2013).}
with identical circumstances.

Regarding the compensation principle, one can either take an ex-post or an ex-ante view. The ex-post view looks at individual’s actual income and is concerned with income differences amongst individuals with the same responsibility characteristics and different circumstances. The ex-ante approach, instead, focuses on prospects, so there is inequality of opportunity if individuals face different opportunities sets (or sets of different values), because of their circumstances. The ex-ante approach is interesting per se, but it is also useful when effort has not been exerted as yet. We find that, if efforts and circumstances are distributed independently, then ex-post equality of opportunity implies ex-ante equality of opportunity and we confirm Fleurbaey and Peragine (2013) that ex-ante and ex-post compensation are incompatible.

Regarding the reward principle, the focal points in the literature are liberal reward and utilitarian reward. The former says that the government should not redistribute income between those that share all circumstance characteristics, as their income differences are exclusively due to differences in efforts. The latter says that we should not be concerned with (i.e. express zero inequality aversion with respect to) income differences that are only due to differences in efforts. We confirm again Fleurbaey and Peragine (2013) that utilitarian reward is incompatible with ex-post compensation. We investigate a third reward principle, “inequality aversive reward”, which says that redistribution between individuals that have the same circumstances but different levels of effort is desirable. It can be motivated by either the stochastic nature of incomes and risk aversion (see Lefranc et al (2009)) or the existence of unjustified inequalities in incomes after conditioning on a limited set of circumstances (see Roemer (2012)). Inequality aversive reward, however, is strictly speaking incompatible with equality of opportunity, both ex-post and ex-ante.

We discuss the use of stochastic dominance tools as a test for the existence of inequality of opportunity. Several approaches to measure the amount of inequality of opportunity on the basis of information on outcomes, circumstances and efforts have been proposed in the literature. We distinguish direct measures that measure how much inequality remains when only inequality due to circumstances is left from indirect measures that measure how much inequality remains after opportunities are equalized. Finally, we discuss norm based measures that compute the distance between individuals’ actual incomes and a fair income distribution.

When researchers want to compute inequality of opportunity, they are confronted with several difficulties. They have to decide which outcomes to focus on, which variables are circumstances and which efforts. This is a normative issue, and what to do hinges crucially on the answer to the question what individuals are responsible for. Not all circumstances are always observed. Unobserved circumstances typically lead to an underestimation of the amount of inequality of opportunity. Efforts are often unobserved and observed efforts are correlated with circumstances. The former problem can be resolved using a non-parametric technique proposed by Roemer (1993) or parametric techniques (Salvi (2007) or Björklund et al. (2012)). The latter is typically resolved using
regression analysis, as suggested by Bourguignon et al. (2007). We analyze the implications of these issues and the solutions used in the literature.

The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 first uses a variant of the framework recently developed by Fleurbaey and Peragine (2013) to illustrate the relationship between the core principles in the inequality of opportunity literature. The next section discusses how the insights from this theoretical debate have been used to construct measures of inequality of opportunity. Section 4 discusses several data imperfections: unobserved circumstances, construction of measures of efforts, luck and econometric error terms. Section 5 illustrates the relevancy of the issues discussed in the previous sections by presenting the empirical findings of some recent studies. Section 6 concludes.

2 Principles

In this section we introduce the major insights from the theoretical literature on the evaluation of distributions of incomes from a perspective of equality of opportunity. We assume that we only observe (or want to use) information about individuals’ incomes, their circumstances and their efforts. In particular, we have $m^C$ different circumstances and $m^R$ different efforts, and, for simplicity, we assume that each combination of circumstances and efforts occurs at most once \(^5\), such that the relevant data can be summarized by the $m^C \times m^R$-dimensional matrix of incomes $Y = [Y_{ij}] \in D$ with $D \equiv \{-\} \cup \mathbb{R}^{m^C \times m^R}_{++}$. Entry $Y_{ij}$ equals “-” if the corresponding combination of efforts and circumstances does not occur in the population, and $Y_{ij}$ is the income obtained by someone with circumstance $i$ and effort $j$ otherwise. Following Roemer (1993) (Peragine (2004)), a type (tranche) is a set of people having the same circumstances (efforts).

In the first subsection we define equality of opportunity from an ex-post and an ex-ante perspective. The two remaining subsections formulate requirements on a reflexive and transitive binary relation $\succeq$ defined on $D$, such that $X \succeq Y$ means “opportunities are not distributed more unequal in matrix $X$ than in matrix $Y$”. As usual, $\succ$ and $\sim$ denote the corresponding asymmetric and symmetric relation.

2.1 Equality of opportunity

Ex-post inequality of opportunity has to do with the inequalities within each column of $Y$, while ex-ante inequality of opportunity is concerned with the inequalities between the rows of $Y$ (see Ooghe et al (2007) and Fleurbaey and Peragine (2013)). Hence, there is ex-post equality of opportunity when, within each column of the income matrix $Y$, incomes are equal. From the ex-ante perspective, if we do not have a clear idea how the incomes in a row determine

\(^5\)This is the simplest domain in which we can model situations in which efforts and circumstances are not distributed independently. To extent the analysis to the case where different circumstance-effort combinations occur with arbitrary frequencies requires the introduction of more notation without yielding additional insights.
the value of the opportunities associated with it, we can only say that there is (unambiguously) ex-ante equality of opportunity if all the rows are equal. Hence we obtain the following definitions.

**EOP** (Equality of Opportunity ex-Post): For all $Y \in D$, if for all $j \in \{1, \ldots, m^R\}$ it is such that for all $i, k \in \{1, \ldots, m^C\}$ and all $Y_{ij}$ and $Y_{kj} \in \mathbb{R}_{++}$ : $Y_{ij} = Y_{kj}$, then there is ex-post equality of opportunity.

**EOA** (Equality of Opportunity ex-Ante): For all $Y \in D$, if for all $j \in \{1, \ldots, m^R\}$ it is such that for all $i, k \in \{1, \ldots, m^C\}$ : $Y_{ij} = Y_{kj}$, then there is ex-ante equality of opportunity.

Consider the following income matrix for a society of 7 individuals, 3 types (rows) and 3 tranches (columns):

$$Y^1 = \begin{bmatrix} 10 & 20 & - \\ 10 & 20 & 30 \\ - & 20 & 30 \end{bmatrix}.$$  

Clearly, there are no inequalities within the columns of $Y^1$, and so there is equality of opportunity ex-post, but the rows are not equal. Hence, equality of opportunity ex-ante and ex-post are not the same. In many empirical applications, (see section 4.2) efforts are by construction independently distributed from circumstances. For the domain $D$, that means that every combination of effort and circumstances occurs exactly once or that some efforts do not occur at all. In that case the following proposition holds true.

**Proposition 1**: If efforts and circumstances are distributed independently, EOP implies EOA.

### 2.2 Ex-ante versus ex-post compensation

The first fundamental idea in the literature on equality of opportunity is that differences that are due to circumstances should be compensated. As stated by Fleurbaey and Peragine (2013), compensation can be done ex-post or ex-ante.

Ex-post compensation tries to make the incomes for those individuals having the same effort as equal as possible. Formally,

**EPC** (Ex-Post Compensation): For all $Y, Y' \in D$, if there exist $j \in \{1, \ldots, m^R\}$, $i$ and $l \in \{1, \ldots, m^C\}$, $Y_{ij}, Y'_{ij}, Y_{lj}$ and $Y'_{lj} \in \mathbb{R}_{++}$ and $\delta \in \mathbb{R}_{++}$ such that $Y_{ij} = Y'_{ij} - \delta \geq Y_{lj} = Y'_{lj} + \delta$ and for all $ab \notin \{ij, lj\}$ : $Y'_{ab} = Y_{ab}$, then $Y \succ Y'$.

The only difference between matrices $Y$ and $Y'$ is in column $j$. The distribution of incomes in column $j$ in matrix $Y$ can be obtained by a Pigou-Dalton transfer within the column $j$ in matrix $Y'$, making the elements of the column $j$ more equal. Ex-ante compensation prefers redistribution from a type that is unambiguously better-off to a type that is unambiguously worse-off.
EAC (Ex-Ante Compensation): For all $Y, Y' \in D$, if there exist (i) $i$ and $l$ such that for all $j \in \{1, \ldots, m^R\}, Y_{ij} \in \mathbb{R}^+ : Y_{ij} \geq Y'_{ij}$ with at least one inequality holding strict and (ii) $j$ and $q \in \{1, \ldots, m^R\}, Y_{ij}, Y'_{ij}, Y_{lq}$ and $Y'_{lq} \in \mathbb{R}^+$ and $\delta \in \mathbb{R}^+$ such that $Y_{ij} = Y'_{ij} - \delta$ and $Y_{lq} = Y'_{lq} + \delta$ and for all $ab \notin \{ij, lq\} : Y'_{ab} = Y_{ab}$, then $Y \succ Y'$.

Condition (i) guarantees that in matrix $Y$ type $i$ is unambiguously better-off than type $l$, while condition (ii) implies that the inequalities between types $i$ and $l$ are larger in matrix $Y'$ than in matrix $Y$.

While both conditions look reasonable, it has been shown by Fleurbaey and Peragine that they are incompatible. To see this, consider the following outcome matrices for a situation where we have 4 types and 2 tranches:

$$Y^2 = \begin{bmatrix} 20 & 15 \\ 15 & 10 \\ 30 & 6 \\ 25 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \quad \text{and} \quad Y^3 = \begin{bmatrix} 21 & 15 \\ 15 & 9 \\ 30 & 7 \\ 24 & 1 \end{bmatrix}.$$  

Starting from $Y^2$, we observe that the first row has better opportunities than the second and the third has better opportunities than the fourth. Increasing the inequalities between the first and second row (by increasing $Y^2_{11}$ and decreasing $Y^2_{22}$ with 1 unit) and increasing the inequalities between the third and fourth row (by increasing $Y^2_{32}$ and decreasing $Y^2_{41}$ with 1 unit) results in $Y^3$, such that, by EAC, we have $Y^2 \succ Y^3$. Now, start from $Y^3$, increase the inequalities in the first column (by decreasing $Y^3_{11}$ and increasing $Y^3_{14}$ with 1 unit) and increase the inequalities in the second column (by increasing $Y^3_{21}$ and decreasing $Y^3_{32}$ with 1 unit) and we get $Y^2$. Hence, by EPC, $Y^3 \succ Y^2$, contradicting our previous finding. We have thus illustrated the following proposition.

**Proposition 2** (Fleurbaey and Peragine (2013)): EPC and EAC are incompatible.

The existence of this incompatibility implies that, if one wants to use a compensation principle to compare income matrices from the perspective of inequality of opportunity, a choice has to be made between ex-ante and ex-post compensation.

### 2.3 Reward principles

The second fundamental idea in the literature on equality of opportunity is that efforts should be adequately rewarded. Liberal reward is the first and most prominent reward principle in the axiomatic literature on fair allocations (see, e.g., Bossert (1995), Fleurbaey (1995a) and Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996)) and fair social orderings (see, e.g. Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2005, 2008, 2011)). It states that government taxes and transfers should respect differences in incomes that are due to differences in responsibility. Clearly, in the present (and most
common) formulation of the measurement of inequality of opportunity on the basis of incomes only, it is impossible to take liberal reward into account, as it requires information on the tax and transfer system.

A second reward principle which Fleurbaey (2008) calls utilitarian reward has been used more frequently in the empirical literature. The principle says that respecting the income differences that are due to differences in effort requires zero inequality aversion with respect to differences in incomes that are due to differences in efforts. Hence we have to focus on the sum of the incomes of those that share the same circumstances and we get the following axiom.

\[ UR \] (Utilitarian Reward): For all \( Y, Y' \in D \) such that \( Y_{ij} \not\in \mathbb{R}_{++} \Leftrightarrow Y'_{ij} \not\in \mathbb{R}_{++} \), if for all \( i \in \{1, \ldots, m^C\} \) it is such that \( \sum_{j=1,Y_{ij} \in \mathbb{R}_{++}}^m Y_{ij} = \sum_{j=1,Y'_{ij} \in \mathbb{R}_{++}}^m Y'_{ij} \), then \( Y \sim Y' \).

As shown by Fleurbaey and Peragine, utilitarian reward is incompatible with ex-post compensation. To illustrate this, consider the following income matrices for a situation where we have 2 types and 2 tranches:

\[
Y^4 = \begin{bmatrix}
30 & 5 \\
20 & 10 
\end{bmatrix}
\text{ and } Y^5 = \begin{bmatrix}
29 & 6 \\
21 & 9 
\end{bmatrix}
\]

By EPC, \( Y^5 \succ Y^4 \), while by UR, \( Y^5 \sim Y^4 \), a contradiction. We therefore have the following proposition.

**Proposition 3** (Fleurbaey and Peragine (2013)): UR and EPC are incompatible.

A third reward principle explicitly rejects utilitarian reward by claiming that some compensation is due even after taking circumstances into account. A first, ex-ante reason (see Lefranc et al (2009)), is that, after conditioning on circumstances, incomes are stochastic and since individuals are risk averse, we should evaluate opportunity sets in a risk averse way. A second, ex-post reason (see Roemer (2012)), is that in actual applications not all relevant circumstances are taken into account (for instance because some are unobservable) such that some compensation is due after conditioning on an incomplete list of circumstances. For these reasons, one should not focus on incomes, but take an increasing concave (inequality adverse) transformation of incomes as the relevant outcome variable. This can be called an inequality-averse reward principle.

\[ IAR \] (Inequality Averse Reward): For all \( Y, Y' \in D \), if there exists \( i \in \{1, \ldots, m^C\} \), \( Y_{ij}, Y'_{ij}, Y_{ik} \text{ and } Y'_{ik} \in \mathbb{R}_{++} \) and \( \delta \in \mathbb{R}_{++} \) such that \( Y_{ij} = Y'_{ij} - \delta \geq Y_{ik} = Y'_{ik} + \delta \) and for all \( ab \not\in \{ij, ik\} \): \( Y'_{ab} = Y_{ab} \), then \( Y \succ Y' \).

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6 Theoretical contributions focus on utilities rather than incomes, hence the name of the axiom.
From their respective definitions, it is immediate that UR and IAR are incompatible. There is a fundamental problem with the IAR principle in the present framework: it is incompatible with equality of opportunity. To see this, consider the following income matrices for a situation with 2 types and 2 tranches.

\[ Y^6 = \begin{bmatrix} 30 & 20 \\ 30 & 20 \end{bmatrix} \text{ and } Y^7 = \begin{bmatrix} 29 & 21 \\ 30 & 20 \end{bmatrix}. \]

From IAR it follows immediately that \( Y^7 \succ Y^6 \), but from EOP and EOA, it is clear that \( Y^6 \) corresponds to a situation of equality of opportunity.

**Proposition 4**: IAR is incompatible with both EOP and EOA.

This incompatibility is due to the fact that, dealing with the objections raised by Lefranc et al (2009) on the one hand and by Roemer (2012) on the other hand, requires an extension of the framework to deal with uncertainty, and to incorporate incompleteness of circumstances, respectively. Information on these aspects is absent in most datasets, however.

We can conclude that the framework in which only income matrices are used to make statements on inequality of opportunity has a hard time to deal with reward principles. The informational restriction excludes natural reward from the start, and IAR is essentially incompatible with equality of opportunity. We are only left with UR, which can only be combined with EAC.

## 3 Measures

When comparing actual income distributions from the perspective of inequality of opportunity, the framework has to be adjusted to allow comparisons between income distributions with different circumstance-effort distributions. In addition, the framework should allow for unobserved and random variables. Hence individual \( k \)'s income, \( y_k \), is assumed to depend on his circumstances \( a^C_k \), his efforts, \( a^R_k \), unobserved variables \( u_k \) and a random term \( e_k \), such that

\[ y_k = g \left( a^C_k, a^R_k, u_k, e_k \right) \quad \text{where} \quad g : \mathbb{R}^{d^C} \times \mathbb{R}^{d^R} \times \mathbb{R}^{d^U} \times \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}^{++}. \]

As \( u_k \) is unobserved, and the functional form \( g \) is unknown, the parametric approach imposes a functional form to estimate the equation, yielding the function

\[ \hat{g} \left( a^C_k, a^R_k, e_k \right) \quad \text{where} \quad \hat{g} : \mathbb{R}^{d^C} \times \mathbb{R}^{d^R} \times \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}^{++}. \]

An estimate of \( y_k \) can be obtained by setting \( e_k \) equal to zero in the above equation. Observe that the effect of the unobserved variables will be taken over by the effect of observed circumstances and efforts, to the extent that these are correlated with the unobserved variables. The rest of the effect of unobservables as well as specification errors go into the estimated random variation, \( \hat{e}_k \), which is defined implicitly by the equation \( y_k = \hat{g} \left( a^C_k, a^R_k, \hat{e}_k \right) \). For some purposes,
It is convenient to estimate incomes as a function of, on the one hand, either circumstances or efforts and, on the other hand, random variation:

\[ \hat{g}^C(a_k^C, e_k) \quad \text{where} \quad \hat{g}^C : \mathbb{R}^{d^C} \times \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}_{++}, \]

\[ \hat{g}^R(a_k^R, e_k) \quad \text{where} \quad \hat{g}^R : \mathbb{R}^{d^R} \times \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}_{++}. \]

These equations can be used to estimate incomes by setting \( e_k \) equal to zero. In the first (second) equation, the effect of both omitted efforts (circumstances) and unobservables are taken over by circumstances (efforts) to the extent that these are correlated. The rest of their effect as well as specification errors go into the estimated random variation, \( \hat{e}_C \) \( \hat{e}_R \), which is defined implicitly by the equation \( y_k = \hat{g}^C(a_k^C, \hat{e}_C) \) \( y_k = \hat{g}^R(a_k^R, \hat{e}_R) \). For future reference, let \( N_k = \{ i \in N \mid a_i^C = a_k^C \} \) and \( N_k = \{ i \in N \mid a_i^R = a_k^R \} \), be the sets of individuals sharing the circumstances \( a_k^C \) (belong to the same type) and efforts \( a_k^R \) (belong to the same tranche), respectively.

First we discuss how stochastic dominance can be used to test for equality of opportunity. Next, following Pistolesi (2009), we distinguish between a direct and indirect approach to the measurement of inequality of opportunity. Finally, we discuss an approach based on deviations between actual income and norm income. We conclude the section with an overview.

### 3.1 Testing for equality of opportunity using stochastic dominance

The stochastic dominance approach to the measurement of inequality of opportunity originates from the ex-ante framework. To assume that the value of an individual’s opportunity set is an increasing function of the outcomes obtained by those that have the same circumstances as he is an uncontentious starting point for an ex-ante approach. It suggests that ex-ante inequality of opportunity can be established as soon as some type’s cumulative distribution function of income first order stochastically dominates another type’s cumulative distribution function. Hence the absence of first order stochastic dominance between type’s cumulative distribution functions can be seen as a test for ex-ante equal opportunities. Formally, let, for all \( i \in \{1, \ldots, m^C\} \), \( F_i(y) \) denote the cumulative distribution function of income of type \( i \). A weak test of ex-ante equality of opportunity tests the following condition.

**AFOSD** (Absence of First Order Stochastic Dominance): there does not exist \( i, l \in \{1, \ldots, m^C\} \), such that, for some \( y \in \mathbb{R}_+ : F_i(y) < F_l(y) \) and for all \( y \in \mathbb{R}_+ : F_i(y) \leq F_l(y) \).

If one adheres to an inequality averse reward principle, one can go further. In that case, as advocated by Lefranc et al. (2009), absence of first order stochastic dominance can be strengthened to the requirement of absence of second order stochastic dominance between types’ cumulative distribution functions.
ASOSD (Absence of Second Order Stochastic Dominance): there does not exist \(i,l \in \{1,\ldots,m^C\}\), such that, for some \(y \in \mathbb{R}_+\) : \(\int_0^y F_i(\tilde{y}) \, d\tilde{y} < \int_0^y F_l(\tilde{y}) \, d\tilde{y}\) and for all \(y \in \mathbb{R}_+\) : \(\int_0^y F_i(\tilde{y}) \, d\tilde{y} \leq \int_0^y F_l(\tilde{y}) \, d\tilde{y}\).

Proposition 1 states that, if effort is distributed independently from circumstances, then ex-post equality of opportunity implies ex-ante equality of opportunity. As a consequence, rejecting ex-ante equality of opportunity implies rejecting ex-post equality of opportunity such that, if AFOSD or ASOSD is rejected, we must also reject ex-post equality of opportunity.

### 3.2 Direct measures

A first approach determines the amount of inequality of opportunity directly by estimating the inequality in a counterfactual income distribution \(y^c\) in which all inequalities due to differences in effort have been eliminated, such that only the inequality that is due to differences in circumstances is left:

\[
I(y^c).
\]  

The crucial distinction between ex-ante and ex-post approaches lies in the construction of the counterfactual \(y^c\). From an ex-ante viewpoint, we should replace every individual’s actual income by some evaluation of his opportunity set.

So far the ex-ante approaches proposed to implement \(I(y^c)\) rely mostly on a non-parametric estimate of the value of each individual’s opportunity set. The following proposals have been made in the literature:

\[
y^c_{k1} = \frac{1}{|N_k|} \sum_{i \in N_k} y_i, \tag{2}
\]

\[
y^c_{k2} = \frac{1}{|N_k|} \sum_{i \in N_k} \tilde{y}_i, \tag{3}
\]

where \(\tilde{y}_i\) is the \(i\)-th largest level of income in the set \(N_k\). The first proposal, inspired by utilitarian reward, is due to Van de Gaer (1993) and measures the value of an individual’s opportunity set by the average income of those that are his type. The income distribution \(y^c\), in which every individual’s income is replaced by the mean income of his type is called the “smoothed income distribution” by Checchi and Peragine (2010). Since all income differences that are due to circumstances are morally objectionable, Van de Gaer proposed an inequality index with infinite inequality aversion. Checchi and Peragine (2010) and Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) point out that most standard inequality indices can be used to measure inequality in the smoothed income distribution in (1) because they have the property that, if a transfer is made from an individual in

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\(^7\)As this ordering is only sensitive to what happens to the worst-off type, it does not satisfy axioms EAC nor UR defined in section 2. It is straightforward to formulate a leximin extension that satisfies both axioms, however.
a richer type to an individual in a poorer type, regardless of the former being richer than the latter, their value falls. The second proposal, (3), was formulated by Lefranc et al (2008) and measures the value of the opportunity set by the surface under the generalized Lorenz curve of the income distribution of the individual’s type. As such, it embodies the inequality averse reward principle.

The only parametric estimate of \( y^c \) has been put forth by Ferreira and Gignoux (2011). As efforts can be correlated with circumstances (see also section 4.2.4), they propose to measure the value of an individual’s opportunity set as

\[
y^c_k = g^C (a^C_k, 0),
\]

such that everybody’s opportunity set is valued by the reduced form estimate of his income, given his circumstances and with the random term equal to its expected value 0.

From an ex-post point of view, to eliminate all inequalities that are due to efforts, we replace every individual’s income by the income he could have obtained if he would have put in a reference level of effort. Roemer (1993) was the first to propose such an ex-post approach to compute (1) and used a non-parametric procedure. He fixes a reference value for the responsibility variable \( \pi^R \) and defines set \( N_k^\pi = \{ i \in N_k \mid a^R_i = \pi^R \} \), which contains all individuals that have the same circumstances as individual \( k \) and have the reference value for the responsibility characteristic. Next define

\[
y^c_k (\pi^R) = \frac{1}{|N_k^\pi|} \sum_{i \in N_k^\pi} y_i,
\]

the average income of those that are of the same type as individual \( k \) and have the reference value for the responsibility characteristic.\(^8\) Applying (1) results in an inequality measure whose value depends on the reference value \( \pi^R \), which we denote by

\[ I (y^c_k (\pi^R)) \]

Roemer argues that the choice of reference value \( \pi^R \) is arbitrary\(^9\), and proposes therefore the following averaged inequality measure:

\[
\frac{1}{n} \sum_{l=1}^{n} I (y^c_l (a^R_l)).
\]

As all inequalities that are due to differences in circumstances are morally objectionable, Roemer proposes to apply an infinite inequality aversion to compute \( I (y^c_k (a^R_l)) \) in (6) and puts \( I (y^c_k (a^R_l)) \) equal to the lowest value of the vector \( y^c_k (a^R_l) \) divided by mean income.\(^10\)

\(^8\)In case \( N_k^\pi = \emptyset \) this procedure runs into difficulties. If Roemer’s identification axiom is used to identify effort (see section 4.2.1) this does not occur.

\(^9\)There exist by now some theoretical results on the consequences of taking different reference values in the context of particular models -see, e.g., Luttens and Van de gaer (2007), but the choice of reference value remains an unsettled issue.

\(^10\)As it is only sensitive to the lowest income for each effort, the index does not satisfy EPC as defined in section 2. It is easy to formulate a leximin extension that satisfies it, however.
The ex-post approach to implement (1) parametrically was proposed by Pistolesi (2009)\textsuperscript{11} and it is obtained by setting a reference value for the responsibility variable, $\pi^R$ in the estimate of the function $g\left( a_k^C, a_k^R, e_k \right)$:

$$y_k^{\text{C5}} (\pi^R) = \hat{g} \left( a_k^C, \pi^R, e_k \right).$$

(7)

Compared to the non-parametric methodology, the parametric methodology has the advantage that it always yields meaningful estimates for $y_k^{\text{C5}}$, even when the combination $(a_k^C, \pi^R)$ does not occur in the sample. In the computation of $y_k^{\text{C5}}$, $e_k$ can be set equal to zero, or to its estimated value $\hat{e}_k$. The former amounts to treating $e_k$ as an effort variable with reference value zero, the latter to treating it as a circumstance. Most authors take the mean value for effort in the sample as the reference value $\pi^R$. Following Roemer, one could use an averaged inequality measure similar to (6), where $y_k^{\text{C5}} (\pi^R)$ replaces $y_k^{\text{C4}} (\pi^R)$.

3.3 Indirect measures

A second approach determines the amount of inequality of opportunity indirectly by comparing the inequality in the actual distribution of income, $I\left( y \right)$, to the inequality in a counterfactual income distribution where there is no inequality of opportunity $I\left( y^{EO} \right)$. This results in the measure

$$\Theta_I \left( y, y^{\text{EO}} \right) = I\left( y \right) - I\left( y^{\text{EO}} \right).$$

(8)

Almost all applications of indirect measures to inequality of opportunity construct a counterfactual income distribution that eliminates all inequality between individuals having the same effort. As such, they are measures of ex-post inequality of opportunity, but, remember proposition 1: when effort is distributed independently of circumstances, absence of inequality of opportunity ex-post implies equality of opportunity ex-ante such that these counterfactuals imply ex-ante equality of opportunity. We show that for each of the counterfactuals listed in the previous subsection, there exists a dual counterfactual in the indirect approach that implies ex-post equality of opportunity.

Consider first the dual counterfactuals associated with ex-ante approaches in section 3.2. The dual counterfactual to (2) was proposed by Checchi and Peragine (2010): they construct the counterfactual

$$y_k^{\text{EO1}} = \frac{1}{|N_k|} \sum_{i \in N_k} y_i,$$

(9)

which replaces every income by the average income of those sharing the same efforts. It is straightforward to provide an alternative, by defining the dual to (3):

$$y_k^{\text{EO2}} = \frac{1}{|N_k|} \sum_{i \in N_k} i \hat{y}_i,$$

\textsuperscript{11}Schokkaert et al. (1998) already applied a similar procedure in a health context.
where $\bar{y}_i$ is the $i$-th smallest level of income in the set $N_k$.

Also the dual to the parametric ex-ante approach can be used to define counterfactuals implying ex-post equality of opportunity: the dual to (4) yields

$$y_{kEO}^3 = \hat{g}^R (a_k^R, 0).$$

Next, consider the duals based on the counterfactuals in the direct ex-post approach. To obtain the dual to Roemer’s direct ex-post non-parametric approach (5) and (6), fix a reference value for circumstances, $\pi^C$. Next define

$$y_{kEO}^4(\pi^C) = \frac{1}{|N^C_k|} \sum_{i \in N^C_k} y_i,$$

the average income of those that have the same responsibility vector as individual $k$ and have the reference value for circumstances. To eliminate the dependence of the resulting measure of inequality of opportunity on the choice of reference circumstances, $I(y_{EO})$ in (8) can be replaced by the averaged inequality index

$$\frac{1}{n} \sum_{l=1}^{n} I(y_{EO}^4(a_l^C)). \hspace{1cm} (10)$$

The dual to (7) is due to Bourguignon et al. (2007): fix a reference value for the circumstance variable, $\pi^C$ to obtain

$$y_{kEO}^5(\pi^C) = \hat{g} (\pi^C, a_k^R, e_k). \hspace{1cm} (11)$$

Also here $e_k$ can be set equal to zero or to its estimated value $\hat{e}_k$. The former treats it as a circumstance with reference value zero, the latter as an effort. Most authors take the mean value for circumstances in the sample as the reference value $\pi^C$. Again this choice can be criticized for being arbitrary. This can be overcome by replacing $I(y_{EO})$ in (8) with an averaged inequality index, similar to (10), where $y_{kEO}^5(\pi^C)$ replaces $y_{kEO}^4(a_l^C)$.

All of the above approaches rely on counterfactuals ensuring ex-post equality of opportunity and thereby entail ex-ante equality of opportunity when efforts are distributed independently of type. But even then, however, ex-post equality of opportunity is not necessary for ex-ante equality of opportunity. In the literature there is only one proposal that assigns to individuals opportunity sets of equal value, without imposing full ex-post equality of opportunity. This proposal is the non-parametric proposal by Checchi and Peragine (2010), which evaluates individual’s opportunity sets by (2) and constructs the counterfactual

$$y_{kEO}^6 = y_k \frac{\mu(y)}{y_k^T}, \hspace{1cm} (12)$$

where $\mu(y)$ is mean income of vector $y$ such that everybody’s income is scaled up or down by the ratio of average income and the value of his opportunity set as measured by (2). Observe that $\frac{1}{|N_k|} \sum_{i \in N_k} y_{iEO}^6 = \mu(y)$, such that, when
opportunity sets are measured as in (2), in distribution \( y^{EO6} \) everybody has indeed an opportunity set of the same value. Evidently, this procedure can be applied when opportunity sets are valued differently, like, e.g., when they are valued according to (3). The corresponding counterfactual then becomes

\[
y_k^{EO7} = y_k \mu(y) \frac{y_c^2}{y_k^2}.
\]

### 3.4 Norm based measures

The axiomatic literature has shown that liberal reward and ex-post compensation are incompatible (Bossert (1995), Fleurbaey (1995a)). The literature on (opportunity) fair allocations proceeded by characterizing first best redistribution mechanisms that satisfy weakened versions of the principles—see, Fleurbaey (2008) for an overview. Such redistribution mechanisms assign to every individual an income, as a function of his circumstances and efforts, in such a way that both liberal reward and ex-post compensation are to some extent satisfied. As shown by Devooght (2008) and Almas et al (2011), these (partial) solutions to the liberal reward / ex-post compensation dilemma can be incorporated in a measure of equality of opportunity or, in their language, a measure of offensive or unfair income inequality, respectively. The idea is to treat the level of income that these rules assign to a particular individual as the norm that he should get, and measure offensive inequality by the distance between the actual income vector \( y \) and the norm income vector \( y^n \). Formally, one computes

\[
I(y, y^n),
\]

where the function \( I(\cdot, \cdot) \) has to satisfy at least two requirements. First, since it matters how far each individual is from his norm income, the measure must satisfy partial symmetry (i.e. be invariant to permutations of \((y_k, y^n_k)\) pairs), but not full symmetry (where different permutations can be applied to the vectors \( y \) and \( y^n \)). Second, due to the heterogeneity of the population in terms of compensation and responsibility characteristics, the usual transfer principle does not apply. These arguments induce Devooght (2008) to propose Cowell’s (1985) measure of distributional change, a special case of which is the generalized entropy class. Measures of distributional change have the property that a transfer from a rich to a poor person decreases the value of the measure if and only if the ratio of the actual income of the rich and poor person is larger than the ratio of their norm incomes. Almas et al. (2011) define unfair treatment of each individual as the absolute value of the difference between his actual income and norm income and propose an unfairness Gini to aggregate these differences. Here, a transfer from a person who is less unfairly treated to a person who is more unfairly treated diminishes the value of the index.

Devooght takes the egalitarian equivalent allocation, first suggested in the equality of opportunity context by Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996), as the norm. Almas et al. take in the main part of their analysis the generalized proportionality allocation, first proposed by Bossert (1995), as the norm. The computation
of the norm incomes proposed by Devooght and Almas requires estimation of
the outcome function, $\hat{g}(a^C_k, a^R_k, e_k)$. To compute the norm, in both papers, $e_k$
is replaced by its estimated value $\hat{e}_k$.

Other first-best redistribution mechanisms exist that do not require the es-
timation of $\hat{g}(a^C_k, a^R_k, e_k)$ and can be computed non-parametrically -see, e.g.,
the observable average egalitarian equivalent and the observable average condi-
tional egalitarian mechanism proposed in Bossert et al (1999). They have not
yet been used in the norm based approach and can be combined with any in-
equality measure that satisfies partial symmetry and does not satisfy the usual
transfer principle (like the unfairness Gini, the generalized entropy or the di-
vergence measures discussed by Magdelou and Nock (2011)) to obtain valid
non-parametric alternatives for the norm based approach.

3.5 Overview

Table 1 summarizes the approaches to the measurement of inequality of oppor-
tunity. Six observations follow from our discussion.

A first observation is that we propose several new measures. New indirect
ex-post measures ($y^{E02}, y^{E03}, y^{E04}$) are generated by constructing counter-
factuals with ex-post equality on the basis of the counterfactuals used in the
direct approach. We showed how Checchi and Peragine (2010)’s indirect ex-ante
approach can be adjusted to deal with inequality averse reward in $y^{E07}$. We
argued that the choice of a reference value for either efforts ($y^{c4}$ and $y^{c5}$) or
circumstances ($y^{EO4}$ and $y^{EO5}$) should receive more attention. Roemer’s aver-
gaged inequality of opportunity measure may overcome the arbitrariness of the
choice of reference value to some extent. Finally, we pointed out that the norm
income approach can be applied non-parametrically by using the observable
average egalitarian equivalent or the observable average conditional egalitarian
mechanisms, proposed by Bossert et al (1999).

A second observation is that many different inequality measures have been
used, often without much justification. The only exceptions are in the norm
based and in the direct measurement approach. In the former, an inequality
measure that replaces the standard transfer principle by a more suited transfer
principle and satisfies partial symmetry is necessary. In the latter, an infinite
inequality aversion was motivated from the normative point of view that all
inequalities that are due to differences in circumstances are unacceptable. We
believe that this argument is a powerful one for welfare measurement, but is less
convincing for measuring inequality of opportunity as it ignores most inequal-
ities. Sometimes additional arguments can be used to single out a particular
measure or sets of measures. For instance, Checchi and Peragine (2010) and
Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) motivate the use of the mean log deviation by
pointing out that it is the only decomposable inequality measure that is path
independent (Foster and Shneyerov, 2000), which implies that non-parametric
direct approach with (2) as counterfactual and indirect approach with (12) as
### Table 1: Approaches to the measurement of inequality of opportunity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Testing for inequality of opportunity (Stochastic Dominance)</th>
<th>First Order</th>
<th>Second Order</th>
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<tr>
<th>Direct and Indirect Measures</th>
<th>Direct Ex-Ante</th>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$y^{c1}$</td>
<td>IA</td>
<td>Van de gaer (1993)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDM</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lefranc et al. (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$y^{c2}$</td>
<td>IA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gini</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLD</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lefranc et al. (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$y^{c3}$</td>
<td>IA</td>
<td>Ferreira and Gignoux (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLD</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ferreira and Gignoux (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$y^{c4}$</td>
<td>IA</td>
<td>Roemer (1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDM</td>
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<td>Aaberge et al. (2011)</td>
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<tr>
<td>$y^{c5}$</td>
<td>IA</td>
<td>Aaberge et al. (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLD</td>
<td></td>
<td>Aaberge et al. (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pistolesi (2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$y^{c6}$</td>
<td>IA</td>
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<td>MLD</td>
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<td>Pistolesi (2009)</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Norm Based (Ex-post)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$y^{n}$</td>
<td>Set2</td>
<td>Observable average egalitarian equivalent allocation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$y^{n}$</td>
<td>Set2</td>
<td>Observable average conditional egalitarian allocation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Egalitarian equivalent allocation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$y^{n}$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Devooght (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$y^{n}$</td>
<td>Gini</td>
<td>Generalized proportional allocation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$y^{n}$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Almas et al. (2011)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 1: NP=non-parametric; P=Parametric.

Note 2: ∞ IA: Infinite Inequality Aversion; RDM: Rank Dependent Mean; MLD: Mean Logarithmic Deviation; Set1: MLD, Theil, half squared coefficient of variation and standard deviation of Log of income; Set2: any inequality measure satisfying partial symmetry and a weak but not strong transfer principle; DC: Distributional Change.
counterfactual yield the same results.\footnote{It is easy to verify that in this case for the mean log deviation, $\theta_1 (y, y_{EO7}) = I (y) - I (y_{EO7}) = I (y^*)$.} Pistolesi (2009) uses for the direct measurement approach a whole set of inequality measures, as his main concern is to compare direct and indirect parametric methodologies.

A third observation is that the stochastic dominance approach is by its very nature non-parametric. We started out by motivating it from an ex-ante point of view, but if efforts and circumstances are distributed independently, rejection of the absence of first or second order stochastic dominance implies ex-post inequality of opportunity.

A fourth observation is that norm based approaches have only been applied using the income allocations from the axiomatic literature concerned with ex-post inequality of opportunity as the norm distribution. The counterfactuals used in the indirect approach can also be used as the norm income distribution. Using either $y_{EO6}$ or $y_{EO7}$ yields a norm based on ex-ante equality of opportunity without requiring ex-post equality of opportunity when efforts are distributed independently of type.

Fifth, it is important to realize that the indirect approach cannot be interpreted as a norm based approach. In the norm based approach it crucially matters who gets what, while in the indirect approach this is not the case, as different permutations can be applied to $y$ and $y_{EO}$ in (8). This makes the indirect approach unattractive as a normative measure of inequality of opportunity. The indirect approach is often used to answer the question to which extent income inequality is due to inequality of opportunity. This is a meaningful question for any plausible measure of income inequality, but for true opportunity egalitarians, those concerned with equality of opportunity rather than equality of outcome, the answer to the question is irrelevant.

Finally, as especially the previous observations make clear, the theoretical basis for many of the inequality measures that are used remains rather weak. A lot of work remains to be done to sort out the attractive from the unattractive ones.

4 Data imperfections

In this section we confront some important problems facing the application of the framework described in the previous section: how to choose and measure circumstances, how to measure efforts and the consequences of imperfectly measuring circumstances or efforts.

4.1 Circumstances

Measured inequality of opportunity crucially depends on the set of circumstances chosen. Often researchers are limited by the scarcity of data on circumstances beyond basic individual characteristics and family background. We discuss this issue in section 4.1.2. In principle, the set of circumstances that
should be included follows from the answer to the question what should indi-
viduals be held responsible for. This is taken up next.

4.1.1 Selection of circumstances

Incomes are determined by many factors. Many of these factors have been
put under the label “luck”. Social background luck refers to factors related to
the family or social origin one happens to fall into, such as family or social
networks. Genetic luck refers to constituent characteristics of the individual,
such as genetically inherited factors like talent or sex. Brute luck (Dworkin
1981b) refers to situations where the individual cannot alter the probability
that an event takes place. Option luck (Dworkin 1981b) arises when individuals
deliberately take risk, which is assumed to be calculated, isolated, anticipated
and avoidable. Whether individuals should be compensated for the effects of
different forms of luck has been extensively discussed in the literature (see the
references given below). Two prominent views can be found.

A first view argues that individuals ought to be held responsible only for
what lies within their control – defended, inter alia, by Arneson (1989), Cohen
(1989), and Roemer (1993, 1998a). Control is related to the recognition of
free will, the existence of which is sometimes disputed. Those who deny the
existence of free will, such as the hard determinists, take an extreme position
and include nearly all observables in the circumstance set and consider almost
all inequalities as unfair. Most empirical studies, however, adopt a possibilist
criterion, which is consistent with the existence of free will, and classifies social
background luck, genetic luck and brute luck as circumstances. On the basis of
this view, one can argue that also age, and contextual variables such as access to
basic services, e.g. clean water, sanitation, electricity or transportation, should
be included in the circumstance set.

A second view contends that individuals ought to be held responsible for their
preferences and the ensuing choices – advocated, inter alia, by Rawls (1971),
ground luck and genetic luck belong to the realm of responsibility if the dif-
ferential effect they bring about reflects exclusively differences in preferences.
All other effects of social background and genetic luck should be compensated.
Brute luck is a circumstance as the individual is not responsible for such events
happening. Since risks of option luck are avoidable and taken deliberately,
most proponents of the responsibility for preferences view argue that the result-

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13 It has been argued, however, that full compensation for brute luck may entail huge re-
distribution, cause large distortions thereby diminishing opportunities for all and that im-
plementation of compensation for brute luck requires a lot of information about individuals
which is usually not available. Therefore some authors put forward other, weaker justice re-
quirements. For instance, Vallentyne (2002) suggests to compensate only for initial brute luck,
that is, brute luck that occurs before individuals are deemed responsible for their choices and
preferences, but not for later brute luck, that is the brute luck that occurs after a “canonical”
moment (Arneson, 1990) where individuals become responsible for their choices and prefer-
ences. As Lefranç et al. (2009) suggest, as long as initial and later brute luck are related,
compensation for the former implies at least partial compensation for the latter.
ing differences in outcomes are legitimate. \footnote{Fleurbaey (1995b) argues in favor of full compensation because with option luck small errors of choices may involve disproportionate penalties, which he considers unjust. In his recent book, though, Fleurbaey (2008) provides arguments for partial compensation. He sees option luck as consisting of two distinct components: on the one hand, the individual decision to choose a lottery, which is a voluntary act and thus does not deserve compensation, and on the other hand, the randomness intrinsic to any lottery, which should be at least partially compensated for.}

The big divide between opportunity egalitarians is between those advocating responsibility for control and those advocating responsibility for preferences. As Fleurbaey (2008) persuasively explains, under the belief that free will exists, the control approach comes very close to the preference approach to responsibility, as genuine control is “typically defined in terms of choices reflecting authentic preferences” (p. 250). In addition, the preference approach may be extended to hold people responsible for any preference or characteristic which they endorse, i.e. which they would have chosen were they in control. Notwithstanding all this, he goes on to argue, the two approaches may yield substantively different conclusions when advantage results from preferences, which have not been chosen in any sense and are not endorsed by the individual. Since control, choice and endorsement are very hard to observe, it is very difficult to test empirically whether the control and the preference approach are close to or far from each other.

4.1.2 Unobserved circumstances

Application of equal opportunity theories without observing any circumstances is impossible.\footnote{Nieuhes and Piechl (2012), however, show that panel data can be used to define an upper-bound to inequality of opportunity when only time variant efforts are observed by identifying the individual fixed effect as the exogenous effect of exogenous circumstances (and time invariant effort variables).} In practice, measuring circumstances is easier than measuring efforts and different datasets can be combined to obtain a more comprehensive set of circumstances, as in Ferreira et al (2011). Even then an exhaustive list of circumstances is typically not available, however. Assume that we have directly observed the relevant efforts, but did not observe all relevant circumstances. Consider the following income matrices for a society of 4 individuals and 2 effort levels:

\[
Y^8 = \begin{bmatrix} 5 & 15 \\ 10 & 20 \end{bmatrix}, \quad Y^9 = \begin{bmatrix} 5 & - \\ 10 & - \\ - & 15 \\ - & 20 \end{bmatrix} \quad \text{and} \quad Y^{10} = \begin{bmatrix} 7.5 & 17.5 \\ 7.5 & 17.5 \end{bmatrix}.
\]

In matrices $Y^8$ and $Y^9$ everything is observed. In the former, circumstances and efforts are uncorrelated, in the latter, rows 1 and 2 (3 and 4) contain each one individual belonging to type 1 (2), such that circumstances and efforts are correlated. In both cases, there is inequality of opportunity both ex-post and ex-ante. Now suppose circumstances are not observed. In that case, for each
level of effort, we observe two different income levels (income 5 and 10 for the first effort level and 15 and 20 for the second). The standard way to deal with this in the literature is to ascribe to each level of effort the corresponding average income. This results, for both matrices $Y^8$ and $Y^9$, in their observable counterpart $Y^{10}$. This averaging procedure eliminates both ex-post and ex-ante inequality of opportunity. In case some circumstances are observed, unobserved circumstances and the averaging procedure decreases ex-post and ex-ante inequality of opportunity. We summarize in the following proposition.

**Proposition 5**: Unobservable circumstances lead to an underestimation of inequality of opportunity.

### 4.1.3 Contribution of different circumstances to inequality of opportunity

Consider the indirect measurement approach (see section 3.3), which determines the amount of income inequality that remains when there is no inequality of opportunity left. The Bourguignon et al. (2007) approach determines this counterfactual income distribution as the one that results when everyone has the same reference circumstances -see (11). By not equalising all circumstances at once Bourguignon et al. (2007) estimate the partial effect of one (or a set) of circumstance variables $J$, controlling for the others ($j \neq J$). Following their specification of the function $g(a_C^k, a_R^k, e_k)$, let

$$\ln y_k = \beta_C a_C^k + \beta_R a_R^k + e_k,$$

and construct alternative counterfactual distributions

$$y_{k}^{EO(J)} = \exp \left[ \hat{\beta}_J a_C^J_k + \hat{\beta}_{j \neq J} a_C^{j \neq J}_k + \hat{\beta}_R a_R^k + \hat{e}_k \right],$$

where $a_C^J_k$ is the vector of reference values of the circumstances in set $J$ and $a_C^{j \neq J}_k$ the vector of actual circumstances of individual $k$ of the circumstances in the complement of the set $J$. This allows to compute inequality of opportunity due to a given (set of) circumstance(s), $J$ in spirit of the indirect ex-ante parametric approach by replacing $y^{EO}$ in (8) by $y^{EO(J)}$ defined above. To compute each circumstance’s contribution to overall inequality one can use the Shapley decomposition (Shorrocks, 1999), which avoids the problem that results are sensitive to the ordering in which circumstances are put at their reference value. This approach has become quite popular recently (see, e.g. Björklund et al. (2012)).

### 4.2 Constructing measures of effort

To apply ex-post compensation, we need to identify individuals’ efforts in a normatively attractive way. Effort variables are shaped by circumstances. Preferences and tastes, for instance, are partly shaped by family background. Whether

---

16 In $Y^{10}$ we are abusing notation, as different rows do not correspond to different observed circumstances.
we should correct for this is closely related to the answer to the question what people are responsible for (see subsection 4.1.1). Those defending responsibility for preferences (and the resulting choices) will typically argue that it does not matter where these preferences come from, as long as people identify with them. Those defending responsibility by control (like Roemer (1993, 1998a and 1998b)) argue that, as people do not control their circumstances, raw effort variables should be cleaned to obtain normatively relevant efforts. This view is dominant in most empirical applications to date. We discuss four different procedures used in the literature to construct normatively relevant effort(s).

4.2.1 Unobservable effort, non-parametric identification

If no effort variables are observed, the lack of data can only be overcome with some auxiliary hypotheses. The most elegant and frequently used comes from John Roemer (1993), and is stated as follows.

RIA (Roemer’s Identification Assumption): those that are at the same percentile of the distribution of income conditional on their type have exercised the same degree of effort.

This assumption can be derived from more fundamental hypothesis about the income generating process and the distribution of circumstances and effort. More in particular, as pointed out by Fleurbaey (1998, p.221), RIA assumes that (A1) the multi-dimensional effort variables \( a^R_i \) can be aggregated into a scalar measure of responsibility \( a^r_i \) in such a way that with every value for \( a^R_i \) corresponds exactly one value for \( a^r_i \) and that income is a strictly increasing function of \( a^r_i \) and (A2) \( a^r_i \) is distributed independently of \( a^C_i \). While (A2) is, as argued by Roemer, within the responsibility by control view, a natural assumption for normatively relevant effort, assumption (A1) is very strong. To see the consequences of imposing RIA when (A1) does not hold true, consider the following income matrices.

\[
Y^{11} = \begin{bmatrix} 5 & 20 & 10 \\ 5 & 15 & 30 \end{bmatrix} \text{ and } Y^{12} = \begin{bmatrix} 5 & 10 & 20 \\ 5 & 15 & 30 \end{bmatrix}.
\]

Here, \( Y^{11} \) represents the true income matrix, while \( Y^{12} \) is the income matrix after identifying effort using RIA. Clearly, RIA leads to an underestimation of inequality of opportunity ex-post, while it does not affect inequality of opportunity ex-ante.

**Proposition 6:** Imposing RIA erroneously does not affect ex-ante inequality of opportunity but leads to underestimation of ex-post inequality of opportunity.

RIA allows us to take the percentile within the income distribution of an individual’s type as the normatively relevant measure of his effort. By construction effort is distributed uniformly over [0, 1] for all types and consequently independently distributed of type. Hence, proposition 1 applies, such that we obtain corollary 7.
Corollary 7: Under RIA, ex-post equality of opportunity implies ex-ante equality of opportunity.

When RIA is imposed, testing whether (AFOSD) can be rejected can thus be interpreted as a weak test of ex-post equality of opportunity.

Finally, suppose that we have a vector of observed circumstances \(a_{CO}\) and a vector of unobserved circumstances \(a_{CU}\). We apply RIA and determine effort by

\[ F(y | a_{CO} \ i) \]

Moreover, assume that \(a_{CU}\) is either \(a_{CU}^C\) or \(a_{CU}^V\). In that case,

\[ F(y | a_{CO} \ i) = F(y | a_{CO}^C, a_{CU} \ i) p_i (a_{CU}) + F(y | a_{CO}^V, a_{CU} \ i) p_i (\pi_{CU}), \]

where \(p_i (a_{CU})\) and \(p_i (\pi_{CU})\) are the fraction of the observations with \(a_{CO} = a_{CO}^C\) that have \(a_{CU} = a_{CU}^C\) and \(\pi_{CU}\), respectively. The cumulative distribution function \(F(y | a_{CO}^C)\) is a weighted average of the cumulative distribution functions of true types, \(F(y | a_{CO}^C, a_{CU} \ i)\) and \(F(y | a_{CO}^V, a_{CU} \ i)\). The only case in which the percentile of \(F(y | a_{CO}^C)\) provides correct information on the percentiles of the true types is when \(F(y | a_{CO}^V, a_{CU} \ i) = F(y | a_{CO}^C, a_{CU} \ i)\), meaning that, after conditioning on observed circumstances, the unobserved circumstance does not affect outcomes. In all other cases, effort will be wrongly identified and, the larger the effect of the unobserved circumstance on the true conditional cumulative distribution functions, the less representative identified effort is for true effort. We summarize this point in the following proposition.

Proposition 8: Under RIA, unobserved (or omitted) circumstances induce wrong identification of effort unless the unobserved circumstances, after conditioning on observed circumstances, no longer affect income.

4.2.2 Unobservable effort, panel data and parametric identification

Consider the case where no efforts are observed, but the researcher has access to panel data. In this case, Salvi (2007) exploits the longitudinal features of panel data to identify effort by distinguish between time-varying and time-invariant circumstances and efforts. Efforts are assumed unobservable and divided into individual traits that do not change over time \((a_{k}^R)\), such as skills, preferences or aspirations, and the exertion of effort, which is time-varying \((a_{kt}^R)\). Individual traits, \(a_{k}^R\), are modeled as unobservable time-invariant individual effects, while the exertion of effort, \(a_{kt}^R\), cannot be distinguished from the idiosyncratic error term, \(\nu_{kt}\). Circumstance variables are also broken down into time-varying \((a_{kt}^C)\) and time-invariant \((a_{k}^C)\), and are assumed observable. Thus, the income variable is modeled as:

\[
\ln y_{kt} = \beta_1 a_{kt}^C + \beta_2 a_{k}^C + a_{k}^R + a_{kt}^R + \nu_{kt}.
\]

error term, \(\varepsilon_{ii}\)

\[ t-v \text{ circ.} \quad t-i v \text{ circ.} \quad \text{ind. traits} \quad \text{exertion} \quad \text{brute luck+white noise} \]
Individual traits, $a^R_k$, are allowed to be correlated with circumstances, but effort exertion is distributed independently from circumstances. Using the estimates $\left( \hat{\beta}_1, \hat{\beta}_2, \hat{a}^R_k, \hat{\varepsilon}_{kt} \right)$ of equation (15), Salvi proceeds to compute a counterfactual distribution similar to (11) by setting (all) circumstances at the sample mean value $\overline{a}^C_{kt}$ and $\overline{a}^C_k$. She estimates inequality of opportunity by means of (8); her approach is indirect ex-post parametric. The econometric error terms are lumped together with efforts. Her counterfactual implies that she holds individuals responsible for their efforts, even if these efforts are correlated with circumstances. This is different in the next two subsections.

4.2.3 Observable effort correlated with circumstances

Suppose that we observe (all) effort variables, but they are correlated with circumstances. Roemer (1993 and 1998b) suggests to use then the technique described in section 4.2.1, and to determine an individual’s responsibility as his percentile in his type’s distribution. There exist evident alternatives. As proposed by Schokkaert et al. (2004) and Bourguignon et al. (2007), a variety of econometric techniques, like regression analysis, can be used to obtain cleaned normatively relevant effort variables.

Bourguignon et al. (2007), develop this idea as follows. They model earnings, $y_k$, as a function of effort ($a^R_k$) and circumstance ($a^C_k$) variables,

$$
\ln y_k = \beta^C a^C_k + \beta^R a^R_k + \varepsilon_k,
$$

where $\beta^C$ and $\beta^R$ are parameter vectors, and $\varepsilon$ denotes pure random factors. The estimates $\left( \hat{\beta}^C, \hat{\beta}^R, \hat{\varepsilon} \right)$, are used to construct a counterfactual $y^{EOD}$ similar to (11), in which only the direct effect of circumstances is eliminated. Inequality of opportunity, obtained through the indirect approach (8) and $y^{EOD}$, holds individuals responsible for the full effect of efforts on their income.

Effort, however, may depend on circumstances:

$$
a^R_k = Ha^C_k + v_k,
$$

where $H$ is a matrix of parameters relating circumstances and efforts, and $v$ denotes pure random factors. The counterfactual distribution $y^{EODT}$, which eliminates both direct and indirect effect of circumstances, can be obtained by using the parameter estimates of (16) and (17), or by estimating the reduced form of (16) and (17):

$$
\ln y^*_k = \psi a^C_k + \varepsilon_k,
$$

where $\psi = [\beta^C + \beta^R H]$ and $\varepsilon_k = \beta^R v_k + \varepsilon_k$ and use of the estimates $\left( \hat{\psi}, \hat{\varepsilon}_k \right)$, to construct $y^{EODT}$ in a way similar to (11). The inequality of opportunity estimate, obtained through the indirect approach (8) and $y^{EODT}$ holds individuals only responsible for that part of effort that is not correlated with their circumstances.
4.2.4 Unobservable effort, parametric identification

Björklund et al. (2012) take the analysis a step further and allow the distribution of effort conditional on type to have different variances, as initially suggested by Roemer (1998a). They assume that effort has two components: a type specific component, $\eta^i_k$, whose variance ($\sigma_i^2$) differs across types $i$ and which captures the part of effort that is correlated with circumstances, and a second component, $\omega_k$, with a homogeneous variance, $\sigma^2$. The latter is defined as a standardization of the former, $\omega_k = \eta^i_k / (\sigma_i^2 / \sigma^2)$, so that the income generating process can be written as:

$$\ln y_k = \beta^C a^C_k + \eta^i_k = \beta^C a^C_k + \tilde{\eta}_k^i + \omega_k$$

(19)

where $\tilde{\eta}_k^i = (\eta_k^i - \omega_k)$ measures the influence of circumstances on the conditional variation of the outcome around the expected value for each type, $i$. The term $\tilde{\eta}_k^i$, then, captures the indirect effect of circumstances, while $\omega_k$ is assumed to capture ‘pure’ effort. By construction, just like with RIA, pure effort is distributed independently from circumstances.

Using the estimates $(\hat{\beta}^C, \hat{\eta}_k^i, \hat{\omega}_k)$ of equation (19), and taking as reference value for circumstances their mean, they compute counterfactual income distributions similar in spirit to (14) to compute the contribution of the different components of (19) to income inequality. Finally, also here the econometric error terms are lumped together with efforts, implying that everything that traditionally enters the error term (specification error, omitted circumstances) determines measured effort.

4.2.5 Non-parametric versus parametric methods

Omitted circumstances are an issue for both types of methods. Proposition 8 shows that they lead to a wrong identification of effort for Roemer’s non-parametric method. For parametric methods, the same holds true, because omitted circumstances affect the estimated errors to the extent that they are not correlated with observed circumstances and econometric errors are lumped together with efforts.

Parametric methods, rely on functional form assumptions, and, contrary to non-parametric methods may suffer from specification errors. Three reasons may justify such cost. First, controlling for circumstances in a multivariate regression framework uses data more efficiently, and allows for finer categories. As the vector of observed circumstances becomes larger (and the number of categories within each variable increases) the number of types and tranches grow exponentially, which leads to type-tranche combinations with very few (possibly zero) observations, such that sampling variances are very large, and estimates become unreasonably imprecise\(^{17}\). Second, the above problem is even more severe when (some) circumstances are continuous variables. Clearly, there

\(^{17}\)In such cases, the proposal made in Donni et al. (2012), to use a latent class technique that endogenously determines the types (and number of types) provides a way out for non-parametric methodologies.
exist non-parametric techniques like kernel density estimation that have already been used and allow one to deal with continuous circumstances (see, e.g., O’Neill et al. (2000) or Nilsson (2005)), but these techniques require large data sets to yield reliable estimates. As a result, in case one only has small datasets, parametric approaches become an attractive alternative. Third, as explained in section 4.1.3, the parametric methodology permits the estimation of the partial effect of one (or a set) of the circumstance variables $J$, controlling for the others ($j \neq J$), such that we can compute inequality of opportunity due to a given (set of) circumstance(s), $J$. However, also in this approach, the econometric error terms are lumped together with efforts, implying that everything that traditionally enters the error term (specification error, omitted variable bias) determines measured effort. In the next section, we reflect on how to deal with error terms.

4.3 Error terms

In section 3 we introduced omitted variables $u_k$ and random variables $e_k$ in the analysis. In practice, $u_k$ captures the effects of omitted circumstances and efforts, while specification errors heavily affect $e_k$. Given the diversity of the samples and econometric techniques used, it becomes difficult in general to say much about the importance of error terms. Nevertheless, the following observations can be made.

Due to data limitations most empirical studies include a limited set of circumstances in their list. Virtually all studies include a measure of social background luck (parental income, parental education). Very few surveys have observations on genetic luck. An exception is Björklund et al. (2012): they find IQ, measured at the age of 18, to be the most influential factor behind inequality of opportunity in Sweden. Interpreting IQ as a measure of genetic luck, this suggests that genetic luck can be an important contributor to the error term if it is not included in the list of circumstances. We are unaware of forms of brute luck or option luck being included in the list of circumstances such that they always enter the error terms. As it is often claimed (see section 4.1.1) that genetic luck should be fully compensated, that some compensation is due for brute luck, and we cannot know what part of the error term should be included as a circumstance, the argument seems to call for some compensation for the effects of luck such that the principle of utilitarian reward (using a full list of circumstances) can be replaced by inequality averse reward (since one is typically using only a limited list of circumstances).

5 Empirical applications

Are the different approaches and methods outlined in the previous sections important in practice? How sensitive are the findings to the various modelling options implemented in the literature? As outlined in the Introduction, this paper is motivated by the unordered and unsystematic manner that the literature
has rapidly grown in the recent years. This means that there is no empirical pa-
per that applies in a systematic manner the various approaches put forth in the
literature—and reviewed in the previous sections—to the same data, and shows
whether and to what extent different methodological options matter when im-
plemented to large data sets. Such comparative study is high on our research
agenda.

This section reviews a selected sample of studies to see how empirical find-
ings shed light on the various points that we have emphasized in the previous
sections. To do so, we will draw mostly on studies that implement more than
one approach to the same data. We shall address seven relevant questions. Is
the stochastic dominance approach able to detect inequality of opportunity? Does
the ex-post versus the ex-ante dilemma matter in practice? Does it make
a difference whether we use direct or indirect measures? Do norm-based ap-
proaches yield different results than non-norm based approaches? What is the
importance of indirect effects of circumstances? What can we learn from the
different treatment of the error term in parametric approaches? What are the
most important circumstances?

5.1 Stochastic dominance

An application of the use of stochastic dominance is Lefranc, Pistolesi and
Trannoy (2008), who compare nine Western countries from the perspective of
inequality of opportunity by comparing the pre-tax and net disposable household
income distributions in these countries for male-headed households aged 25-40,
conditional on three levels of social background. They compare pairwise the
cumulative conditional distributions within each country by means of first and
second order stochastic dominance and are the first to use rigorous statistical
tests for stochastic dominance, using the non-parametric stochastic dominance
tests developed by Davidson and Duclos (2000). Sweden is the only country
for which equality of the conditional cumulative distribution functions cannot
be rejected. Then comes West Germany, followed by a group of 3 countries
consisting out of Great Britain, Belgium and Norway. In France, Italy, the
Netherlands and the U.S., they find second order stochastic dominance relations
between all conditional cumulative distribution functions, indicating unequal
opportunities between all social background groups. It is remarkable that, even
though only 3 types are distinguished by Lefranc et al., the stochastic dominance
approach is able to detect inequality of opportunity.

5.2 Ex-ante vs. ex-post

Cogneau and Mesplé-Somps (2008) compute (1) to compare ex-ante and ex-post
inequality of opportunity in five African countries. The outcome variable is
household consumption per head and circumstances are based on fathers’ social
origins (farmers, non farmers with at most primary education and non farmers
with more than primary education) and region of birth. They measure ex-
post inequality, identifying effort assuming RIA and using the minimum income
relative to the mean as inequality index in (6). Ex-ante individuals’ opportunity sets are valued by average type income (2) and ex-ante inequality is measured by the lowest average type income divided by mean income in the country. As the cumulative distribution functions of different types do not cross, they find that the inequality of opportunity ranking for the five countries does not depend on which of both measures is taken.\footnote{This is a well known property of these specific measures. As the cumulative distribution functions do not cross, for a given percentile (level of effort), it will always be the same type that has the lowest income. But then, the average over these lowest incomes has to coincide with the average value of the opportunity set of the worst-off type.}

Checchi and Peragine (2010) compute ex-ante and ex-post inequality of opportunity in Italy using also a non-parametric methodology for the indirect approach (8). They apply this framework to gross annual earnings, take family background (measured by highest educational attainment of the parents) as the circumstance variable. In the ex-ante approach average type income (2) measures the value of the opportunity set; the counterfactual is given by (12). In the ex-post approach, effort is identified assuming RIA and the counterfactual distribution is (9). The mean log deviation is used as inequality index. Ex-ante inequality of opportunity accounts for about 15% of total income inequality whereas ex-post inequality of opportunity accounts for 20%.

Checchi et al. (2010) use the same non-parametric approach to EU-SILC data to measure inequality of opportunity for post-tax individual earnings to measure inequality of opportunity in 25 European countries. Circumstances are the highest parental education of the parents, parental occupation, gender, nationality and density of the area where the individual lives. Ex-ante inequality of opportunity is between 2.5 to 30% of income inequality, while ex-post inequality is between 16 to 45% of total income inequality. They find a high correlation between ex-ante and ex-post measures, but the ranking of the countries differs.

From the last two papers, we conclude that ex-ante and ex-post approaches yield different results. Moreover, these papers use RIA when measuring ex-post inequality of opportunity. We have seen that, if this assumption is not valid, RIA leads to an underestimation of ex-post inequality of opportunity (proposition 6). As the above papers find that ex-post inequality of opportunity is larger than ex-ante inequality of opportunity, this could imply that they underestimate the difference between ex-ante and ex-post approaches.

\subsection*{5.3 Direct vs. indirect measures}

As explained in Section 3.5, non-parametric direct and indirect measures yield the same results if the mean log deviation and specific counterfactuals are used. However, even in this case, due to the functional form assumptions involved in parametric approaches, results will differ when taking a parametric approach (Ferreira and Gignoux (2011)). Notwithstanding this, the studies that use a parametric approach to compare direct (1) and indirect (8) measures, i.e. Pistolesi (2009) and Ferreira and Gignoux (2011), find similar results. The former study takes an ex-post view while the latter adopts an ex-ante view. This sug-
gest that direct and indirect measures yield similar results irrespective of the view taken. Likewise, the similarity appears to be rather robust to different inequality measures. Pistolesi (2009) finds that the similarity of the results holds for several inequality indices (the Theil index, the Gini index, the mean log deviation and the standard deviation of logs), but differences are more pronounced for the half squared coefficient of variation.

5.4 Norm vs. non-norm based measures

Devooght (2008) computes norm based inequality of opportunity taking the egalitarian equivalent solution as the norm and Cowell’s measures of distributional change as inequality index. He uses households’ pre-tax labor income in a sample of Belgian individuals in 1998. Income is estimated by means of specification (16), and the least favorable value of each circumstance characteristic is taken as reference value in the computation of the egalitarian equivalent norm. The author concludes that, depending on the set of circumstances and the reference value for the circumstance characteristics, “responsibility-sensitive inequality measurement considers about 90-97.5% of traditionally measured income inequality as offensive” (p. 290). This is much larger than the inequality of opportunity found with non-norm based approaches.

Almas et al. (2011) compute norm based inequality of opportunity taking the generalized proportionality principle as the norm and a Gini index defined over deviations from the norm as inequality index. The empirical application is based on a large sample of Norwegian citizens. Households’ annual labor earnings are estimated as a function of effort and circumstance characteristics, the specification is again of the form (16), and post-tax incomes are imputed. Using an extensive set of six responsibility variables, unfair inequality is about 75% of total inequality, again a much larger estimate than obtained with other approaches.

Norm based measures seem to yield much larger estimates of inequality of opportunity than other approaches. This conclusion has to be taken with caution, though, as there are no empirical studies that directly compare estimates of norm based and other approaches, which means that such differences may also be due to differences in other methodological options, or simply because they use different datasets. Differences however are sufficiently large making it hard to believe that they would disappear.

5.5 The role of indirect effects of circumstances

Bourguignon et al. (2007) estimate the indirect effect of five circumstances (father’s and mother’s education, father’s occupation, race, and region of birth) through their impact on three observed effort variables (own education, migration out of hometown, and labor market status) –see section 4.2.3 for details–,

\footnote{The set of six responsibility variables do not include the error term of the regression. As we explain below, when the error term is included, unfair inequality drops substantially.}
and find that the indirect effect accounts for 40% of the overall effect of circumstances. Björklund et al. (2012) measure an additional indirect effect of circumstances by the heterogeneous type-specific variances, as explained in section 4.2.4, and find that type heterogeneity accounts for 20 to 50% of the overall effect of circumstances, depending on the inequality index. From this, we conclude that accounting for the indirect effect of circumstances on efforts makes a big difference in the assessment of inequality of opportunity.

5.6 Treatment of residuals

Parametric approaches leave a substantial part of the variation unexplained, which goes to the residual. The decision to treat residuals as circumstances or efforts, is thus important for the analysis. Hence, checking the robustness of the results with respect to this choice is imperative. Almas et al (2011) do such sensitivity exercise and find unfair inequality to double and even triple when residuals are included in the circumstance set. Devooght (2008) reports that treating the residual as an effort variable instead of as a circumstance variable reduces the distance between the actual and the norm distribution by about 50%, ceteris paribus. Almas (2008) also experiments with the role of the residuals from the estimated equation, treating them as a circumstance variable (leading to an upper bound of unfairness) or as a responsibility variable (leading to a lower bound of unfairness) in the computation of the norm. She finds Germany to display more unfair inequality than the US for the upper bound of unfairness, but the opposite result for the lower bound. The previous three papers use the norm based approach and can hence choose whether to include the residual in the circumstance or in the effort set. Contrary to that, when effort is not observable and the non parametric method RIA is applied, the error term is de facto treated as an effort variable, such that inequality of opportunity estimates should be considered as lower bound estimates.

5.7 Most important circumstances

There is little consensus about the most important circumstance variable: different circumstances account for the largest share of income or consumption inequality in regions with different economic conditions and degree of economic development. Björklund et al. (2012), using the largest set of circumstances of all studies to date, find IQ to be the most influential circumstance for Sweden. Bourguignon et al. (2007), however, find parental education to be the most influential circumstance for Brazil, whereas, for Nepal, Salvi (2007) concludes that family background has little effect and instead infrastructure and ethnicity are the most influential circumstances.
6 Conclusion

We have seen that equality of opportunity can be defined ex-post and ex-ante and that the two definitions coincide if efforts and circumstances are distributed independently (proposition 1). Compensation can also be done from an ex-post or ex-ante perspective, which are incompatible (proposition 2). The two most common reward principles are liberal reward, which requires information on the tax transfer system, and utilitarian reward, which is incompatible with ex-post compensation (proposition 3). We proposed a third reward principle, inequality-averse reward which can be motivated if, after listing observed circumstances, there remain factors for which compensation is due, like unobserved circumstances or if randomness of incomes within each type lead to the use of a risk-averse ex-ante evaluation of types’ possible incomes. However, one must keep in mind that, in the standard framework where only information on incomes, efforts and a limited set of circumstances is used, inequality averse reward is incompatible with equality of opportunity (proposition 4).

A first empirical approach tests for the existence of inequality of opportunity by testing for stochastic dominance between the cumulative distribution functions of different types. This approach is easiest to motivate from an ex-ante perspective, but if efforts are distributed independently from circumstances, existence of stochastic dominance also implies ex-post inequality of opportunity. The three other approaches try to measure the amount of inequality of opportunity. The direct approach computes inequality in a counterfactual distribution where all inequalities due to differences in efforts have been eliminated. The indirect approach computes the difference between inequality in the actual income distribution and inequality in a counterfactual without inequality of opportunity. We stressed the duality between the counterfactuals on which these two approaches rely and used this duality to formulate new indirect measures of inequality of opportunity. The norm based approach computes the difference between the actual income vector and a norm income vector that (imperfectly) incorporates liberal reward and ex-post compensation.

We feel that the indirect approach should be considered as an instrument to decompose income inequality into inequality that is due to circumstances at on the one hand and efforts on the other, but this question is of secondary importance only, as our main concern is with inequality of opportunity itself, not with inequality of incomes. For that reason, to measure inequality of opportunity, the direct and the norm based approach are more suited.

The choice which circumstances to include is not an easy one. In principle, one should include all factors that affect individual incomes and for which compensation is due. From a responsibility by control view, that also means that one should correct for the influence of circumstances on efforts. From a responsibility for preferences and choice view, whether efforts should be cleaned from the effect of circumstances depends on the way circumstances affect efforts. If circumstances only influence preferences, and individuals identify with these preferences, no compensation is due. Compensation is due only to the extend that circumstances influence incomes in any other way.
In practice, researchers often only have a limited set of circumstances at their disposal. Unobserved circumstances lead to an underestimation of inequality of opportunity (proposition 5). Moreover, they affect the identification of effort when it is identified using Roemer’s identification axiom (proposition 8). When parametric procedures are used, unobserved circumstances also create a problem: that part of their effect that is not taken over by observed circumstances goes into effort, which is therefore, also here misidentified. The error term then contains random error and part of missing circumstances but also part of missing effort variables, in proportions that are unknown.

Although there are only few studies comparing the performance of different approaches and methods, some tentative conclusions may be drawn from the reviewed empirical literature. First, taking an ex-ante or an ex-post perspective is an important choice which can affect the results, as in Checchi and Peragine (2010) and Checchi et al. (2010). Second, computing inequality of opportunity by the direct or indirect approach yields similar results (Pistolesi (2009), Ferreira and Gignoux (2011)). Third, with norm based approaches the share of unfair income inequality is much higher than with non-norm based approaches. Fourth, while it can be insightful to model the direct and indirect effects of circumstances (as the latter are found to account for a substantial part of overall opportunity inequality by Bourguignon et al. (2007) and Björklund et al. (2012)), if all one wants to do is assessing the extent of inequality of opportunity from a responsibility as control approach, such that both direct and indirect effects of circumstances should be taken into account, a reduced form estimate, regressing only circumstances on incomes, is enough. Fifth, when taking a parametric approach, treating error terms as circumstance or as effort may make a whole difference, as Almas (2008) shows. Hence, the robustness of the results with respect to this choice should always be checked. Sixth, there is little consensus about the most important circumstance variable: different circumstances account for the largest share of income or consumption inequality in regions with different economic conditions and degree of economic development.

We can conclude that a lot of work has been done so far, but also that a lot remains to be done. Inequality of opportunity can be computed in many ways. The theoretical basis of many measures needs further scrutiny. At the present stage, especially the direct measurement and the norm based measures have attractive features, but more thought on the choice of reference values is necessary. It would also be interesting to know how sensitive the ranking of different countries is to the measure chosen, and whether differences in rankings are due to conceptual differences between the measures. This requires that the same data set is used to compute all measures.
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